We analyze the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) on the functioning of financial analysts. We find that after controlling for macroeconomic effects, the impact of Reg. FD on absolute forecast errors is insignificant. Analysts are however more likely to make divergent predictions in the post-FD period indicating greater independence. We also find that the importance of idiosyncratic information discovery and analysis increases in the post-FD period. Analysts are also reducing the number of firms they are covering, consistent with their having to conduct more independent research, and are more likely to drop large firms that are already well covered. We further find that analysts who had 
Introduction
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) requires that all material information be communicated to all investors at the same time. The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) stated objective for issuing the rule was to eliminate the practice of selective disclosure of information to certain preferred analysts and institutional shareholders. Reg. FD went into effect from October 23, 2000 and has generated considerable controversy regarding its impact on analyst forecasting ability.
There are two distinct and disparate viewpoints about the potential impact of Reg.
FD. According to groups representing the analyst industry such as the Securities Industry Association (SIA) and the Association for Investment Management Research (AIMR), Reg. FD would lead to deterioration in information quality and quantity and impair analysts' forecasting ability 1 . The SIA's claim is based on the results from surveys which indicated that analysts were experiencing considerable difficulty in arriving at reliable earnings forecasts post-FD due to lower quality and quantity of information available 2 .
We label this the "impairment effect". The other view, advocated by the SEC and small investor groups, is that Reg. FD should not impact quality of information available to 1 SIA's comment letter to SEC states "we believe that these communications help get information into the marketplace, whereas the proposal will discourage issuers from exchanging ideas or information with analysts, as well as deter analysts from vigorously competing to glean useful information for their clients and the markets". Full text at: http://www.sia.com/2000_comment_letters/pdf/sec_regulation_Reg. FD_4-6.pdf 2 SIA's report, Costs and Benefits of Regulation Reg. FD, reports results from in-depth interviews with 30 analysts and also results from an AIMR survey of 422 analysts (buy and sell-side analysts in both cases). 47% of analysts interviewed by SIA (57% in case of AIMR) felt that companies were communicating less post-FD. Further 72% of analysts interviewed by SIA (56% in case of AIMR) felt that information communicated by issuers to public was of lower quality post-FD. The SIA report is available from: http://www.sia.com/reg_Reg. FD/pdf/RegReg. FD.pdf analysts and that it would merely remove the timing advantage enjoyed by preferred analysts prior to the passage of the rule 3 . According to this view Reg. FD, analysts would have strong incentives to produce independent unbiased research, as they would no longer worry about managers cutting off their information flow if they issued unfavorable ratings 4 . We label this the "independence effect".
We use the I/B/E/S summary database to create a matched sample of pre-FD and post-FD forecast information. We find that the absolute forecast error has increased after Reg. FD, providing preliminary support for the impairment effect. However, when we control for the macroeconomic downturn in l ate 2000 around the same time as the passage of Reg. FD, we find that the differences in forecast errors are insignificant.
We then examine the measures of dispersion of analyst forecasts using two metrics: the standard deviation of forecasts at a given point in time and the range of forecasts. We find that both measures of dispersion are significantly higher in the post-FD period. These results largely remain robust even after controlling for the uncertainty induced in the forecasting environment as a result of the economic downturn. A detailed examination shows that the number of analysts making forecasts exactly at the consensus has significantly reduced in the post-FD period. Together, these results indicate support for the independence effect of Reg. FD. 3 The SEC states in the text of the final rule for Reg. FD that "We believe issuers will have strong reasons to continue releasing information given the market demand for information and a company's desire to promote its products and services". Full text of the Final Rule can be obtained from: http://www.sec.gov/ Next, we examine the sources of the independence effect in greater detail by studying analysts' reliance on common versus idiosyncratic information in arriving at forecasts. We measure the precision of common and private information, pre and post-FD, using the Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1998) framework. We find that the precision of idiosyncratic private information increases post-FD, while the precision of public information decreases. There is no impact on the precision of total information.
This indicates that analysts are placing more reliance on their private information gathering and analysis. The result refutes the impairment effect argument and suggests that analysts are able to "complete the mosaic" through private information discovery despite losing privileged access to management communications.
In order to corroborate the finding of higher private information discovery post-FD, we examine measures that proxy for analyst effort. The average number of firms covered by an analyst decreases significantly in the post-FD period indicating that analysts are focusing on fewer firms. This is consistent with an increased work-load per firm for individual analysts. Firms that had the highest analyst following pre-FD show the greatest reduction in analyst following, while the firms with the least following pre-FD actually have increased analyst following post-FD. This suggests that analysts are likely to shift coverage in the post-FD environment to firms where they can achieve a unique advantage to their research output. Overall, these results provide evidence consistent with greater analyst independence.
In our final set of tests we study another dimension of the independence effectwhether there is a level information playing field among all analysts post-FD? We exa mine whether analysts who demonstrated superior forecast accuracy in the pre-FD period are able to sustain their superiority in the post-FD period. We instead find a convergence in forecasting ability amongst analyst's in the post-FD period. Analysts who performed the best in the pre-FD period were unable to sustain their superiority post-FD.
Further, the subgroup of analysts that had the best performance pre-FD were more likely to be from large brokerage and investment banks, more likely to be affiliated analysts and more likely to be rated as star analysts. The convergence in performance across different groups in the post-FD period indicates decreasing importance for such linkages.
Our study provides evidence consistent with greater analyst independence and increased private information gathering without deterioration in overall forecasting accuracy in the post-FD period. This contributes to the debate surrounding the passage of Reg. FD and provides support for the SEC's viewpoint as opposed to the SIA's position.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related literature. We derive our hypotheses in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe the data. In Section 5, we outline the methodology used and discuss the results of our tests.
We conclude with a summary of our results in Section 6.
Related Literature
In our paper we focus on the ability of analysts to forecast earnings when they are forced to rely on only public disclosures from firms. We study four aspects of the shift in analysts' ability to forecast in pre versus post-FD periods: (a) ex-post accuracy of forecasts, (b) dispersion of forecasts among analysts, (c) precision of common and idiosyncratic information used in forecasts and (d) persistence of superior forecasting ability by analysts after FD. Associated with these, we examine changes in analyst coverage in response to the changes in the information environment. We present a summary of related research and how they relate to the research questions of this paper.
Forecast Accuracy and Dispersion
Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that forecast error and dispersion vary inversely with quality of disclosure while Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) find that sustained increases in disclosure quality are associated with lower forecast dispersion.
Swaminathan (1991) shows that segment disclosures mandated by SEC, resulted in reduction in dispersion of analyst forecasts.
Public and Private Information
According to Lundholm (1991) releasing a public information signal, in the form of a public disclosure, alters the nature of the demand for public information. Barron, Kim, Lin and Stevens (1988: hereafter referred to as the BKLS model) develop a model to measure the precision of common (or public) information and idiosyncratic (or private) information at the disposal of analysts. Venkataraman (2001) uses this methodology to analyze the effect of mandated disclosures of segment information under SFAS 131 on analysts and finds a higher precision of common information for firms forced to comply with the accounting standard in the post-SFAS 121 environments.
Prior Forecasting Ability
The final aspect of our paper relates to the persistence of superior forecasting ability. Evidence on persistence of forecasting ability has been mixed in prior literature. Sinha, Brown and Das (1997) find that analysts differ in their forecasting ability.
However, Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (1999) find no reliable evidence for performance persistence for brokerage house stock recommendations.
Research on Regulation FD
Our paper is also related to contemporaneous work examining the effectiveness and impact of Reg. FD. Heflin, Subramanyam and Zhang (2002) study the impact of Reg.
FD on stock return volatility and drift. They measure the quality of information environment in terms of many factors including analyst forecast errors, forecast dispersion, and number of voluntary disclosures by firms. Their findings indicate that the information environment has not worsened after the passage of Reg. FD. Our paper complements the results of Heflin et al (2002) by parsing out the impact of Reg. FD on common information and analyst specific idiosyncratic information and changes in the coverage in response to that. In a related paper, Zitzewitz (2002) uses an alternative methodology and finds that Reg. FD has reduced selective disclosure of information about future earnings to individual analysts without reducing the total amount of information disclosed. Sunder (2002) shows that Reg. FD has, to a certain extent, leveled the playing field between large institutional investors and small investors in the capital markets. Gintschel and Markov (2002) study if the Reg. FD has resulted in lower levels of information flow from managers to analysts. They find that the price impact of earnings forecasts made by analysts is lower in the post-FD period. However they do not examine the issue of analyst independence and its impact on analyst forecasts.
Hypotheses
In this section, we draw on the results from prior papers as well as the arguments from the debate over the impairment effect versus the independence effect of Reg. FD to develop our hypotheses.
Forecast Error
Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) show that increases in disclosure are associated with reduced forecast error. If Reg. FD causes reduced management disclosure to analysts, this could result in greater absolute forecast errors and dispersion in the post-FD period. This is likely to be exacerbated because management may no longer informally guide analysts' earnings expectations, making them less likely to get it "spot on". Heflin et al (2002), however, find that forecast errors have not increased after Reg. FD. We focus on absolute forecast error as we wish to examine analysts' accuracy regardless of whether they are optimistic or pessimistic. We state the hypothesis as follows.
H1: Absolute forecast errors in the post-FD period are higher than in the pre-FD period.
Forecast Dispersion
Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) also show that increases in disclosure are associated with reduced dispersion. Reduced disclosure in the post-FD period could also lead to increased dispersion. In addition, if analysts are no longer guided by management, they are more likely to make their forecasts independently, making it more likely that an individual will differ from the opinions of others. We focus on two measures of dispersion -the standard deviation in analysts' forecasts and the range of analysts'
forecasts and state the hypothesis as follows.
H2: Forecast dispersion and the range of forecasts are greater in the post-FD than in the pre-FD period.
Common versus Idiosyncratic Information
Analysts surveyed by AIMR regard spoken word with management as the most important source of information while forming opinions about a company 5 . In the post-FD environment, analysts' ready access to management has been potentially been curtailed. Analysts can rely less on having a private ear to top management on an ongoing basis. This may reduce the precision of the shared or common information that analysts have at their disposal. We conjecture that analysts will have to increase the effort expended on their own private information gathering and analysis. This idiosyncratic information, developed by the individual analysts themselves would be a larger component of the forecasts as opposed to common information stemming from sources such as management. We test the following two hypotheses.
H3-A:
The level of common information reflected in analyst forecasts in the post-FD period is lower than the level in the pre-FD period.
H3-B:
The level of idiosyncratic information reflected in analyst forecasts in the post-FD period is higher than the level in the pre-FD period.
Prior Forecasting Ability
Our final hypothesis relates to whether analysts who had superior performance in 5 An AIMR survey (conducted in early 2000) asks analysts to rank information from private and public sources in order of importance. Spoken word with management is listed as the most important source of information ahead of annual reports, conference calls and in house analysis of information.
the pre-FD period maintain their superiority in the post-FD setting. If the analysts who showed superior performance in the pre-FD period owed their superiority to informational advantages, then they are likely to be more adversely impacted and we will see a convergence in performance amongst analysts. We test the following hypothesis.
H4-A: Analysts who had superior performance in the pre-FD period will be unable to maintain their superiority in the post-FD period.
Prior research has shown that analysts who are well connected with firms possess superior forecasting ability (Dugar and Nathan (1995) , Michaely and Womack (1999) ).
Analysts working for large brokerage houses may develop strong contacts with management in the hope of acquiring underwriting and investment banking business for their firms. Similarly, analysts belonging to underwriting firms that were responsible for the initial public offering or latest capital offering have an information advantage from being affiliated analysts (Lin and McNichols (1997) . In the post-FD setting, such linkage advantages are likely to be less important. We test the following hypothesis.
H4-B: Well Linked Analysts who had superior performance in the pre-FD period will be unable to maintain their superiority in the post-FD period.
Data
Our primary source for information in this paper is the I/B/E/S database. We use information from both the summary database that has information at the firm level, as well as the detail database that has information at the individual analyst level. In order to maximize the power of our tests, we focus on quarterly forecasts of earnings per share.
We focus on the last available forecast of earnings per share available on I/B/E/S prior to the end of the fiscal quarter. This condition ensures that the forecasts are not affected by preliminary earnings announcements after the end of a fiscal quarter.
The tests in this paper compare the properties of analysts' forecasts before and after the passage of Reg. FD (October 23, 2000) . We compare one year of pre-FD data design ensures that seasonality and firm specific characteristics do not impact our results. Table 1 presents a summary of the sample selection process. To maintain consistency with the literature, we impose a restriction of at least five analysts providing I/B/E/S with forecasts. Post-FD forecasts that cannot be matched to corresponding pre-FD forecasts are discarded. Earnings Realizations are obtained from I/B/E/S to ensure consistency with the forecasts. We also impose a condition that each firm should appear in all four quarters both before and after the passage of Reg. FD. Our final sample includes 2756 pre-FD and 2756 post-FD forecasts correspond ing to 698 distinct firms. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the firms in our study. There is a significant difference between the mean and median values of total assets, sales, net income and shareholders equity. For instance, the mean total assets were over 11 Billion, while the median was only around 1.7 Billion. This indicates that the presence of some large firms which increase the mean values dramatically and is not unexpected, given our restriction of their being at least 5 analysts following a firm. Table 3 compares the characteristics of analysts' forecasts before and after Reg.
Results

Univariate Comparisons of Analysts Forecasts before and after FD
FD for the matched sample of pre-FD and post-FD forecasts. The forecast error, defined as (EPS actual -mean (EPS estimate )) scaled by the beginning of period Price has on the average become more negative after Reg. FD, indicating more negative earnings surprises. This probably is related with the worsening state of the US economy after
October 2000. The same holds for unscaled forecast error as well which has increased from positive 0.4 cents to negative 1.8 cents after Reg. FD.
The absolute forecast error, defined as ? EPS actual -mean (EPS estimate )? , scaled by beginning of period price has increased significantly from a mean of 0.0035 in the pre-FD to 0.0050 in the post-FD period. This increase is however insignificant for the unscaled variable, which changes from 6.7 cents in the pre-FD period to around 7.1 cents in the post-FD period. Hence at the univariate level, it appears that the ability of analysts to "get it exactly right" has diminished after Reg. FD.
The range of analyst's forecasts is defined as Max (EPS estimate ) -Min (EPS estimate ), scaled by beginning of period price. The mean range has also increased significantly in the post-FD period. This difference is significant for the undeflated variable as well, which increases from 8.6 cents to 9.6 cents. Finally, we look at forecast dispersion, defined as the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts at a given point in time. The forecast dispersion has also increased significantly for both the scaled and unscaled variables. Hence, analysts tend to have more divergent views after Reg. FD. Table 3 repeats the analysis for the medians. The results are essentially similar, with one significant difference. The difference in the medians of the absolute forecast errors between the two periods is insignificant for both scaled and unscaled variables. Hence, for the median analyst, Reg. FD has had minimal impact on his or her ability to get the forecast absolutely correct. This is consistent with the results in Heflin et al (2002) , who also find that there is no change in the median absolute forecast error after
Panel B of
Reg. FD. 
Control Variables
The tests presented thus far are univariate tests. One of the problems with these tests is that Reg. FD came into effect around the same time that a downturn started in the US economy. This is likely to be pronounced for our matched sample, where the post-FD observations (Nov 2000 to Oct 2001) are likely to be from after the stock market decline, while the pre-FD observations (Nov 1999 to Oct 2000 are from the height of the internet boom. Hence, some of the increase in forecast errors and dispersion is likely to result from the unexpected downturn.
To better isolate the effect of Reg. FD, we include a critical independent variable called SURPRISE. This variable is the surprise from a naïve model that assumes that earnings expectations would be the same as the previous year. It is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the actual realized EPS for a given quarter and the EPS from the same fiscal quarter in the prior year. 6 SURPRISE controls for macroeconomic effects such as the large decline in earnings that firms experienced around the time Reg.
FD came into effect. In addition to SURPRISE, we also use the following control variables that we believe may affect forecast accuracy and dispersion. We include the variance of ROE (VARROE) as a measure of earnings volatility. We control for firm characteristics such as size (as measured by log of the market value of equity), sales growth, and the price to book ratio as a measure of intangible asset intensity. The direction for these control variables is not obvious. Large firms may have complex operations making them inherently more difficult to forecast, but they may also have better information environments and attract better analysts. The same argument can be made for growing firms and firms with high levels of intangible assets. Table 3 presents a correlation matrix between t he dependent variables: ABSFE (scaled absolute forecast error), RANGE (scaled range of forecasts), STDEV (scaled standard deviation of analysts' forecasts), the independent variables, and other variables pertaining to tests discussed later on.
Regression for Absolute Forecast Error
We run regressions for absolute forecast error (ABSFE) using the paired sample described earlier. We define a dummy variable POSTFD that equals 1 for all post-FD forecasts and 0 for pre-FD forecasts, to isolate the effect of Regulation FD. We run the regressions both with and without SURPRISE, so we can isolate the importance of controlling for the earnings surprise. The results are presented in Table 4 . Our first two specifications are OLS regressions. In the first model that excludes SURPRISE, POSTFD has a significant and positive coefficient, confirming the prior univariate result that mean absolute forecast error had increased in the post-FD period. However, when we include SURPRISE, the coefficient on POSTFD is insignificant. SURPRISE has a significant positive coefficient, indicating that the large surprises in the post-FD period may have lead to the increase in absolute forecast error.
Among the control variables, variance of ROE (VARROE) has significant positive coefficient, indicating that firms with high earnings variability are likely to have greater absolute forecast error. Size, sales growth and price to book all have negative coefficients, indicating that larger firms, growing firms and firms with more intangible assets have less absolute forecast error. This is consistent with either these firms attracting the best analysts, or with greater managerial disclosure and guidance to earnings forecasts from such firms. Adding SURPRISE also significantly increases the explanatory power of the regression from around 10% to 38%.
The dependent variable ABSFE is left censored at 0 which may imply that OLS is an invalid specification. Instead, we run a TOBIT regression, which corrects for the left censoring of the distrib ution, and these results are also presented in Table 4 . The results are essentially similar to the OLS regressions. Here, POSTFD has an insignificant coefficient in both specifications.
The regressions highlight an important result. While the performance of analysts may have declined in the post-FD period, one cannot attribute the decline to the passage of the regulation after controlling for the changes that occurred in the macroeconomic environment around the same time. This is consistent with Heflin et al (2002) who also do not find any detrimental effect of Reg. FD on the information environment.
Analysis of Dispersion Measures
We now run similar regressions with the dependent variables being the dispersion measures -RANGE and STDEV. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 5 . As before, we run the regressions both with and without SURPRISE.
In the regressions for RANGE, POSTFD has a significant and positive coefficient that stays significant even when one controls for SURPRISE. Hence analysts are more likely to take on extreme positions after the passage of Reg. FD, a sign of greater independence. The control variables have similar signs as in the regressions for absolute forecast error (ABSFE). In the regressions for STDEV, POSTFD has a significant positive coefficient that becomes insignificant once SURPRISE is included in the regression.
Combining the two sets of regressions, we can say that there is some support for the notion that divergence of opinions among analysts has increased in the post Reg. FD world. This is indicative of greater independence amongst analysts in a world with less managerial guidance. To confirm this, we conduct a simple test where we look at the likelihood that analysts will choose to make estimates exactly at the consensus. We use the I/B/E/S detail database to obtain forecasts of individual analysts and then compare the frequency of estimates exactly at, a cent off and two cents off the consensus in the pre-FD and post-FD periods. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 5 . The likelihood of analysts herding around the consensus has decreased after Reg. FD. For instance, almost 43% of all forecasts were within one cent of the consensus in the pre-FD period, while only 34% of forecasts are within one cent after FD. This corroborates our result that analysts show greater independence in the post-FD world.
Information Environment Before and After Reg. FD
Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1998) develop a model for inferring the information environment tha t analysts operate in by studying the distribution of forecasts (BKLS framework). Information here does not refer only to managerial disclosures but also to any other relevant information that analysts may discover or insight analysts might uncover through their own analysis. They introduce two terms, the precision of public information and precision of private information, which are defined as follows.
They define the precision of public information (h) as
where SE is the squared error of the consensus mean forecast, D is the dispersion among the forecasts, and N is the number of analysts making forecasts.
They further define the precision of private or idiosyncratic information (s) as
The precision of public information, h, measures the extent to which analysts rely on common or public information while coming up with their forecasts.
Conversely, the precision of private information, s, measures the extent to which analysts rely on private or idiosyncratic information while coming up with their forecasts. In addition, we define (h+s) as the precision of total information, similar to Venkataraman (2001) who studies the impact of increased segment disclosures on analysts' information environment. We refer to h, s and (h+s) as PUB, PRIV and TOT respectively. In Table 6 -A, we compare the means and medians of the precision measures before and after Reg. FD. The results indicate that while the precision of public information (PUB) has declined after the passage of Reg. FD, the precision of private information (PRIV) has increased. The precision of total information (TOT) is essentially unchanged. Public information may have declined in precision either because of reduced disclosure from firms or because of less information guidance from managers to analysts.
However, the increase in the precision of private information indicates that analysts compensate for the reduced precision of common information through idiosyncratic information acquired through private information gathering, research and analysis.
To confirm our univariate results, we run regressions with our precision measures 7 Venkataraman (2001) and BKLS scale standard error and dispersion by the absolute value of the consensus estimate. We do not do this as the mean absolute estimate decreased significantly from the pre-FD to the post-FD period causing changes in precision mechanically. Results are similar if we scale by the absolute value of the consensus, but the magnitude of the precision numbers is smaller.
as dependent variables. As before, we include SURPRISE as an independent variable, as the unexpected downturn may also have had an impact on the precision of information.
In addition to the dummy POSTFD, we include controls for earnings variability (variance of ROE), sales growth, firm size (log of market value of equity), and intangible asset intensity (Price to Book ratio). The results are presented in Panel B of Table 6.
In the regression for the precision of public information (PUB), POSTFD has a significant negative coefficient, consistent with our univariate results. Hence, there does appear to have been a decline in the precision of public information, potentially because of reduced disclosure or guidance from management to analysts. However, in the regression for the precision of private information (PRIV), POSTFD has a significant positive coefficient, indicating that there has been a corresponding increase in the precision of analysts' idiosyncratic information. POSTFD has an insignificant coefficient in the regression for total information (TOT), showing that analysts may have compensated for reduced disclosure through private information gathering and analysis.
Among the control variables, SURPRISE has a significant negative coefficient in all regressions, indicating that the economic downturn has diminished the precision of all information. The coefficients on POSTFD, however, behave similarly even when SURPRISE is omitted from the regressions (not shown for brevity). Variance of ROE (VARROE), and sales growth (SGR) generally have negative coefficients, indicating lower precision of information for firms with volatile earnings and rapid growth. Price to Book (PB) has a positive coefficient for public information which may be linked to better disclosure by such firms or the greater competence of analysts following such firms.
Our results provide strong support for the SEC's objectives behind Reg. FD. The reduced precision of public information is counterbalanced by the increased precision of analysts' id iosyncratic information. This corroborates the SEC's view that analysts will have greater incentives for information discovery and analysis and does not support the SIA's viewpoint that analysts' incentives to gather information will be dampened.
A recent survey of corporate executives and sell side analysts conducted by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (from PWC Global's Barometer News Letter) strongly corroborates our results 8 . Analysts responded that they were spending more time and effort on fundamental research and analysis as opposed to predicting next quarter's earnings. This was echoed by corporate executives who opined that top analysts focused more on fundamental research and analysis and less on "playing the earnings game".
Impact on Analysts' Coverage of Firms
Our results thus far implicitly assume that analyst's workloads have increased significantly in the post-FD period. If analysts have taken steps to increase the precision of their private information, it must mean that they expended greater effort in order to gain the necessary information and carry out the proprietary analysis that they need to carry out, especially with the reduced precision of public information. If this is indeed the case, then one should see some evidence of greater work carried out by analysts for each firm covered by them. Either analysts should hire additional manpower to help them cope with the increased workload, or they should drop coverage of some firms and to focus on fewer firms. The former is unlikely, especially given the spate of layoffs on Wall Street.
We now compare the analyst coverage of firms in the pre-FD period to the post-FD period. We look at the entire detail database for these tests to ensure that we are not omitting firms that are a part of an analysts' workload simply because a firm may have had less than five analysts covering it. There were 2608 firms and 3924 analysts for which information was available in both the pre-FD and post-FD period. In order to determine whether an analyst followed a firm, we looked at the entire pre-FD and post-FD period respectively, to account for the fact that analysts may occasionally skip making forecasts or reporting them in time to the I/B/E/S database. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 7 .
There is a reduction in mean number of firms followed per analyst from 6.98 to 6.30. The median analyst dropped one firm and now follows five firms as opposed to six in the pre-FD period. A similar reduction is also seen in the reduction in mean number of analysts per fir, which declines from 9.84 to 9.11. Hence, analysts are reducing coverage in response to the potentially increased workload of the post-FD environment.
Analysts working for large brokerage houses may have had preferential access to management in the pre-FD period because of their potential investment banking and underwriting relationships. Such analysts are likely to be the most adversely impacted in the post-FD setting and likely to have the greatest incremental workload. To test this, we compare the coverage of both big brokerage analysts and other analysts in the pre-FD and post-FD setting. A big brokerage analyst is defined as one whose firm was ranked among the top ten investment banks in 1999. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 7 . Big brokerage analysts reduced their mean coverage from 9.64 to 8.10, a mean reduction of more than 1.5, while the other analysts had a significantly smaller reduction in coverage from 6.59 to 6.04. The median big brokerage analyst dropped one firm and follows 7 firms after Reg. FD as opposed to 8 firms before. The median coverage for other analysts stays at 5 firms. This corroborates the finding that analysts have an increased workload, as the coverage reduction appears to be greatest for big brokerage ana lysts. FD, while firms with the greatest following see decreases in analyst following. The least followed group saw an increase in mean following from 3.10 to 3.86 analysts, while the most followed group saw a decrease from 16.95 to 13.55. Small firms are more likely to see increases in coverage and less likely to see decreases in coverage. The differences between the least followed and most followed firms are highly significant. One obtains similar results if the firms are partitioned on the basis of measures of size instead of analyst following -larger firms see drops in analyst coverage, while the smallest firms see increase in analyst coverage.
This means that analysts are dropping coverage of well followed firms and moving to less covered firms -a leveling of the playing field amongst firms as far as their ability to attract analysts. This is consistent with two mutually consistent explanations. First, analysts prefer to spend their resources in developing their human intellectua l capital on firms where they can distinguish themselves as opposed to being one of the pack. Second, with the strictures in Reg. FD, and the recent crackdown on linkages between investment banking or brokerage business and sell side research, analysts are less likely to seek those firms that are more attractive for the purposes of investment banking or brokerage -i.e. the large well followed firms. Hence Reg. FD appears to have made it easier for the smaller less followed firms to attract additional following.
Impact on the Relative Performance of Individual Analysts
We now examine the impact of Reg. FD on individual analysts. Specifically, we examine if analysts with superior performance in the pre-FD periods are able to maintain their superiority in the post-FD setting. We also provide some preliminary evidence on what the source of superior performance in the pre-FD period might have been.
We use the information from the detail database for the same set of firms that we have information on for our earlier tests. To ensure comparability, as before, we ensure that each pre-FD observation for a given analyst-firm pair is calendar matched to a post-FD observation. All observations are classified into 4 quartiles based on their absolute forecast error in the pre-FD period. This process is carried out separately for each firm.
The bottom quartile consists of those analysts with the greatest absolute forecast errors, while the top quartile consists of analysts with the lowest absolute forecast errors. We then compare the performance of analysts in these quartiles in our pre-FD and post-FD period. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 8 . In order to understand wha t drove the superiority in the pre-FD setting and why these analysts are unable to maintain their superiority in the post-FD world, we examine three characteristics of analysts in the four quartiles. First, we identify analysts who belong to big brokerage houses. Second, we identify an analyst as an affiliated analyst, if he or she belongs to the same firm that was the lead underwriter in the firm's IPO. Table 8 .
Analysts who were top analysts in the pre-FD environment were significantly more likely to belong to large brokerage houses than bottom analysts (49.1% vs. 37.3%).
Further, they were more likely to be affiliated analysts than bottom analysts (6.8% vs.
2.4%), and more likely to be classified as All-Star analysts (32.3% vs. 22.6%) 9 . These results are interesting because such analysts have been alleged to have much greater access to firms than other analysts. The fact that top analysts were unable to maintain their advantages in the post-FD setting may reflect the diminished value of such linkages after the passage of the regulation and may indicate that the informational playing field is indeed leveling out amongst analysts.
To confirm these findings, we sort analysts based on their post-FD performance into quartiles as above and compare the composition of the quartiles. We find no difference in the quartiles as far as the likelihood of the forecast coming from an All-Star analyst, a big brokerage analyst or an affiliated analyst. In other words, in the post-FD environment, well linked analysts were equally likely to be in all four quartiles, while in the pre-FD period, they were more likely to be among the top performers. This confirms the reduced importance of these linkages in the post Reg. FD world.
Conclusion
The passage of Reg. FD represented a landmark change in the information environment that analysts operate in. Reg. FD had two important goals at its core -to level the playing informational field in the capital markets, and to promote analyst independence from management while making earnings forecasts.
This paper attempts to identify the impact that Reg. FD has made on analysts by asking the following research questions. How has Reg. FD affected analyst forecast accuracy? Are analysts more independent after Reg. FD? Has there been a shift in the information environment that analysts operate in, and has this shift come i n the public domain (common information), or in the private domain (idiosyncratic information)? Has the impact been similar for all analysts?
We find that analyst forecast accuracy has not declined after the passage of Reg.
FD. We also find evidence cons istent with greater analyst independence. The precision of public information has declined in the post-FD period, indicating poorer disclosure or less guidance to analysts from firms. However, the precision of private information has increased, indicating that analysts have picked up the slack through their own data gathering and independent research. In response to this increased workload, analysts have scaled back on their coverage of firms. Analysts drop coverage for large well covered firms and increase coverage for smaller poorly covered firms, where their research is more likely to be noticed. Hence, Reg. FD appears to have helped smaller poorly followed firms to attract analyst following.
Reg. FD also appears to have leveled the playing field amongst analysts. In the pre-FD period, analysts with strong linkages to firms were much more likely to be represented in the top echelons of analysts in terms of forecast accuracy. However, in the post-FD environment, these linkages count for less, as well connected analysts are equally likely to be poor performers as they are top performers. Concurrent research by Sunder (2002) and Heflin et al (2002) indicates that FD has leveled the field between different classes of investors. In this paper, we show that FD has also leveled the field between different classes of analysts and between firms. where SE is squared error of the consensus forecast, D is dispersion in analysts' forecasts and N is number of analysts making forecasts. PUB is the precision of public or common information and PRIV is the precision of analysts' private or idiosyncratic information. In addition, we define TOT = PUB + PRIV as the precision of all information. Comparison is made both at the firm level as well as the analyst level. An entire year of quarterly forecasts is used to determine whether a firm was covered by an analyst as sometimes analysts may skip making forecasts for a given quarter. Analyst coverage is then determined for the pre-FD period (Nov 1999 to Oct 2000 and the post-FD period (Nov 2000 to Oct 2001). T Stat is for difference in means using pooled estimates of standard error and Z statistic is for difference in medians using a Wilcoxon sign rank test. 
Panel A: Difference in MEANS and MEDIANS
Panel B: Differential Impact on Different Classes of Analysts
Comparison is made both at the analyst level for two groups of analysts -those belonging to big brokerage houses as defined on page and the remaining analysts. An entire year of quarterly forecasts is used to determine whether a firm was covered by an analyst as sometimes analysts may skip making forecasts for a given quarter. Analyst coverage is then determined for the pre-FD period (Nov 1999 
